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European Central Bank (ECB) if the aim of price stability were widened to include producer prices and relative prices.
Following Gros and Thygesen (1998) we date the beginning of the period of transition to the euro to August 1993 and our period of transition stretches up to December 2005.
Between January 1999 and December 2005 (we denote this the post euro period), Irish producer prices in the manufacturing sector rose by 1.0 percent, while Portuguese manufacturing producer prices rose by 32.9 percent. 2 In contrast, the period of economic convergence from the end of the crisis of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) to the introduction of the euro (the pre euro period which we date from August 1993 to December 1998) 3 exhibited a dispersion of producer-price inflation in the manufacturing sectors of the eleven original euro countries of -1.9 percent (Finland) to 13.1 percent (Italy). Not only are the figures substantially smaller in this period, but exchange-rate changes also compensated these inflation differences; expressed in ECUs, producer price inflation ranged from -1.2 percent (Austria) to 8.6 percent (Finland). The increasing dispersion in extreme developments is not an isolated observation; the standard deviation of cumulative producer-price changes among the eleven countries was 8.9 percent over the post euro period, whereas it was 3.3 percent (in ECUs) over the pre euro period.
These stylized facts admittedly only provide a piece of the puzzle towards understanding the impact of the euro -if any -on the behavior of manufacturing producer prices. Still, they suggest that relative producer-price developments have changed both in character and magnitude. This becomes even more obvious when compared to developments in consumer prices. Consumer-price developments were more stable than producer prices in the post euro period (s.d. 5.7 percent for changes in the harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP)), but at par with producer prices in the pre euro period (s.d. 4.2 percent) . 4 Relative prices of intermediate goods to final goods (PPI/CPI), or the real marginal cost as Huang and Liu (2005) denote them, clearly reveal differences in producer and consumer price developments. In the pre euro period, cumulative relative-price changes ranged from -3.9 percent (Italy) to -9.6 percent (Ireland) with a standard deviation of 1.7 percent, whereas in the post euro period they ranged from 12.7 percent (Portugal) to -21.4 percent (Ireland) with a standard deviation of 9.3 percent. 5 As these stylized facts show, consumer prices are not representative for producer prices.
The Irish "euro" experienced 31.6 percent real depreciation relative to the Portuguese "euro" over the seven-year post euro period with a common currency. Judging from this snapshot of price developments, Portuguese manufacturers have either taken a severe blow from Irish competition (to the extent Irish and Portuguese manufacturers are actually competing), or have experienced the golden days of excess profits (from increasing output prices in less than perfect product markets). To add perspective, over the same period unit labor costs fell by 10.5 percent in Ireland and rose by 14.6 percent in Portugal. Part of the Portuguese price increases could thus be the result of cost-plus pricing, but there is an unexplained component that could either be a source of lost competitiveness or of increasing profitability. Production volumes supply further hints; Portuguese production rose by 6.5 percent over the post euro period, compared to an increase of 53.8 percent in Ireland. Perhaps Portuguese manufacturers did not experience excess profits, after all? Irish manufacturers, on the other hand, seem to have experienced a combination of growing production volumes, productivity, and profit margins.
An important argument behind the introduction of a common currency was that the euro would work as a vehicle for increased transparency and elimination of legal and institutional trade barriers in the euro area. As part of this, the introduction of the euro was expected to eliminate macroeconomic trade barriers (Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff, 1995) . The first few years with the euro have seen historically large spreads across countries in producer-6 price based real exchange and real interest rates making the elimination of macroeconomic trade barriers an issue of the producer-price development.
As to our results, we find strong support for price convergence, even after controlling for other factors influencing producer prices. However, price convergence is equally significant before and after the introduction of the euro and we do not find any specific effect at the time of the introduction of the euro. We also find productivity growth and changes in the effective, trade-weighted "national" euro to influence prices, causing a shift in the behavior of producer prices. Their relative influence exhibits inter-temporal differences.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section I we review arguments for and against an impact of the euro on producer prices and contrast them with prior empirical findings on consumer prices. Section II describes the data and presents stylized facts about the relative producer-price developments in the euro area in 1994-2005. In Section III, we discuss the methodology used. In Sections IV and V we perform our empirical testing of price convergence and the impact of other potential explanatory factors. We also discuss and test the robustness of our results. Section VI provides concluding remarks and policy implications of our findings.
I. Why Might the Introduction of the Euro Influence Producer-price
Developments?
We argue that there are factors that in addition to or via price convergence can cause a link between the introduction of the euro and producer-price development. Below we will discuss them one by one.
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A. Price Transparency
If the introduction of the euro increases price transparency, countries with initially low prices would, according to the law of one price, experience relatively higher inflation than high-price countries during a transition period. This explanation assumes that corporate managers suffer from money illusion arising from expressing prices in different currencies. Psychological experiments by Thomas Mussweiler and Fritz Strack (2004) show that the euro was beneficial to consumers in this respect, but whether this also was the case for corporate managers is still an open question. From a producer viewpoint, reduction of money illusion would reveal itself as reduced possibilities to price to market. There is a supply-side story here as well.
Elimination of money illusion could result in producers redefining their home market from the domestic market to the euro market. Since pricing to market is positively related to the relative size of the foreign market (Michael M. Knetter, 1993; Jiawen Yang, 1998) , the result would be more uniform pricing across the euro zone (George M. von Furstenberg, 2003) .
A common currency also contributes to price transparency by eliminating exchange-rate fluctuations. Exchange-rate fluctuations have been found to be detrimental to trade (see, for example, Pinelopi K. Goldberg and Michael M. Knetter, 1997; Rickard Friberg, 2001 Rogers, 1996) . So far, experience seems to fulfill parts of these expectations. David Barr et al (2003) and Alejandro Micco et al (2002) find that the introduction of the euro increased trade within the euro zone by some 10-30 percent during the first three years of its existence. 6 This is a strong trade impact from the monetary union compared to previous waves of economic integration in the EU (Karen-Helen Midelfart et al, 2003) . 7
B. Economic Convergence and the Balassa-Samuelsson Effect
A large literature has investigated economic convergence and found convincing evidence that low-productivity countries have the ability to grow faster than productivity leaders under certain conditions, in particular under trade liberalization (for example, William J. Baumol, 1986; Xavier X. Sala-i-Martin, 1996; Farhad Rassekh, 1998) . The inference is that trade impacts of the euro could be expected to promote further economic convergence within the euro zone. Matthew Canzoneri et al (2002) analyze productivity trends and real exchange rates in Europe between 1973 and 1997. They conclude that if productivity trends over this period were to continue in the post euro period, euro-zone countries would exhibit trend CPI inflation between -1 percent and 2 percent from the EMU average. von Furstenberg (2003) discusses the potential for productivity-growth differentials in the euro zone at length and concludes that remaining catching-up potential when the euro was introduced could be expected to be a source of extra nontradables inflation. 8 In a Balassa-Samuelson (B-S) world, countries experiencing high growth and accompanying productivity increases would experience wage-driven price increases in nontradables sectors, which would show up as real appreciation when calculating real exchange rates using aggregate price indexes. This would be reinforced if tastes are nonhomothetic and biased towards superior nontradables, because the increasing incomes that accompany the catching-up process would lead to a demand-driven upward pressure on nontradables prices (Peter Neary, 1988; Jeffrey H. Bergstrand, 1991; Ronald MacDonald and Cezary Wójcik, 2004) .
C. The Composition of the Effective Trade-weighted Exchange Rate
The composition of the euro currency basket differs from each member country's effective, trade-weighted exchange rate. This means that a given change of the euro influences prices differently in the member countries (Patrick Honohan and Philip R. Lane, 2003) . 9 Even if absolute purchasing power parity were to hold perfectly for each country we would see differential inflation rates due to differing levels of pass through of exchange rate changes by foreign exporters, as long as product baskets used to measure relative price levels differ. This means that ECB's monetary policy-making will, by construction, be suboptimal; safeguarding the value of the euro will yield different results across countries depending on each country's extra-euro-area exposure.
D. About the Drivers
To summarize, increased price transparency, elimination of exchange-rate fluctuations and ensuing increases in trade and economic convergence could be expected to lead to converging price levels. This would show up as divergent inflation rates during the transition period. In addition, differential imports of inflation could lead to differential -not necessarily converging -price developments, which would show up as divergent inflation rates in periods of asymmetric economic developments. The sources of dispersion of producer-price developments are of importance to economic policy as well as corporate competitiveness.
Inflation differentials stemming from price convergence would be harmful to competitiveness, with producers in previously segmented high-price markets suffering from low-price competition. By contrast, a rise in inflation stemming from economic convergence would be neutral to the extent that it only derives from price increases of nontradables.
E. Findings in Prior Research
While no studies of the relationship between producer prices and the introduction of the euro have been published so far, a handful of studies have investigated the impact of the euro on 
II. Data
We investigate developments in producer prices for the manufacturing sector (industry category D, ISIC revision 3), using data from the OECD Main Economic Indicators Database (vol 2005, release 02, series 045K) for ten of the eleven original euro countries (excl Luxembourg). 10 A key issue when investigating price convergence is access to comparable price-level data. To be completely comparable, the composition of producer-price indices for different countries should be harmonized so as to measure price developments of the same goods and services. Harmonized producer-price indices do not exist, which means that the indices we use are not completely comparable across countries. This is a weakness of studies of producer prices, but a weakness shared by all price studies not using harmonized price indexes. Still, manufacturing producer prices are commonly used as proxies for prices of tradable goods (see, for example, Bill Alterman, 1997) .
A. Calibrating Producer Price Levels
In order to improve comparability we calibrate producer price levels across the euro zone. To the best of our knowledge, the only large-scale producer-price level dataset available is the and expressed in ECU, and we use them to recalibrate each country's monthly manufacturing PPI series (expressed in ECU in the pre euro period and euro thereafter). UVRs are missing for Luxembourg, why we have to exclude this country from the testing.
In Table 1 , that presents relative UVRs for our sample countries relative to Germany, we include for comparison relative unit labor costs (ULC), relative hourly compensation costs (HCC), and expenditure PPPs. Relative price levels differ quite extensively depending on which price measure is used. Correlations between the different measures range from 0.00 13 (UVR and ULC) to 0.88 (HCC and EPPP). The zero correlation between UVRs and ULCs suggests a complete lack of relationship between price levels and labor costs. A high correlation (0.61) between UVR and HCC suggests that price levels rather reflect actual than productivity-adjusted labor costs. The correlation between UVR and EPPP is also found high (0.74), showing a close correlation between output prices in the manufacturing sector and sales prices to consumers.
Insert Table 1 
about here
The price divergences exhibited in the table as of 1997 might seem strange, given the political negotiations preceding the introduction of the euro. However, it seems to be common practice by countries opting for fixed exchange rates to choose fixings at undervalued rates (von Furstenberg, 2003; Laszlo Halpern and Charles Wyplosz, 1997; Lars Oxelheim, 1996) .
As stated by von Furstenberg (2003:523), "[j]oining a multilateral monetary union, such as EMU, at an intentionally biased exchange rate is far more difficult and group-constrained than building in an initial bias when fixing the exchange rate unilaterally. Yet, small developing countries appear to have been given some leeway with regard to the choice of entry rate, even though multilateral negotiations were required." Figure 1 and Table 2 show that the spread between highest and lowest producer prices has dropped rather stably over the pre and post euro periods; in relative terms, the minimum price level increased from 62 percent to 74 percent of the maximum price level. This is one indication of converging prices. During the same time, the standard deviation of euro zone price levels fell from 15.1 percent to 9.4 percent. This change is significant at the 10 percent level, which suggests that the euro countries have experienced σ-convergence. 11 Much of the convergence, both in terms of reduced maximum spread and dispersion took place during the post euro period (the minimum price level was 67 percent of the maximum in December 1998 and the dispersion was 12.8 percent).
B. Producer Price Development in the Euro Zone -1993-2005
Insert Figure 1 about here
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Turning to individual countries in the post euro period, the Portuguese-Irish divergence in producer-price inflation discussed in the introduction is extreme, but not unique. The two countries with the second largest and smallest price increases were the Netherlands (cumulative price increase of 25.9 percent) and France (6.7 percent). This divergence amounts to 18.0 percent real depreciation of the "French euro" to the "Dutch euro", or 2.4 percent per annum. Prices rose sharply in most countries in the early post euro period. In fact, annual price changes reached levels not seen since the early 1980s. This early period of price increases lasted between 1.5-2 years. From then on, prices have been more stable (though with a slight increase in inflation towards the end of the sample period); annual inflation rates observed during 2001-2003 fell to historically low levels, comparable to rates seen just prior to the introduction of the euro.
The pre euro period was characterized by monetary convergence in the run-up to the EMU and inflation rates were low and fairly stable. During this convergence period, the maximum spread in cumulative producer-price changes, in local currency, was 12.5 percentage points. Due to accommodating exchange-rate changes, the maximum spread in producer-price changes, when expressed in EUR, was only 9.8 percentage points, reflecting an effective price decrease of -1.2 percent in Austria and an effective price increase of 8.6 percent in Finland, that is, a real depreciation of the Austrian schilling relative to the markka of 10.0 percent, or 1.8 percent per annum. Figure 2 shows a negative correlation between the initial price level and subsequent price changes. Producer prices have tended to converge over both periods, with countries with the lowest initial price levels having experienced the largest price increases. Also, the downward slope of the trend line for the post euro period is greater than for the pre euro period.
Insert Figure 2 about here
To summarize, producer-price inflation shows considerable swings. Still, we find relative producer-price developments after the introduction of the euro contrasting to the expectations formed by the EU-view on the role of the euro in elimination of barriers to competition.
III. Methods
The main approaches to convergence analysis are absolute and conditional β-convergence and σ-convergence (see Sala-i-Martin (1996) for a detailed exposition and Danny T. Quah (1996) for a critique). Absolute β-convergence prevails when low-price countries tend to experience higher inflation than high-price countries and the trend is towards complete elimination of any price differences. If our expectation of price convergence is correct then convergence in inflation rates (in the phase of transition) would be a logical impossibility. Let π i,t,t+T ≡ log (p i t+T /p i,t )/T be country i's annualized cumulative inflation rate between t and t+T, and let log (p i,t ) be the logarithm of the country's price level at time t. We can then test for absolute β-convergence using a cross-sectional regression,
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(1)
where b < 0 will be an indication of absolute β-convergence. The speed of convergence is then given by │β│ in b = (1 -e -βT )/T. β can also be estimated directly using nonlinear least squares,
where T is the length of the sample period in years. This will in addition yield standard errors for the speed of convergence. Under the null hypothesis of no convergence, β is equal to zero.
In this case, a shock to p i,t is permanent. The half-life of a shock to p i,t is given by -ln(2)/ln(1+β).
One weakness of absolute β-convergence is its implicit assumption that all countries converge to the same price level. This is highly implausible, given that we are considering prices of traded and non-traded goods and services. For example, in a B-S world, a country experiencing high growth would see its price level increasing, even if prices of tradables are completely converged. This means that we would expect different countries to be converging to different price levels. This is the concept of conditional β-convergence. We test this by
where X i,t is a set of conditioning variables. If β < 0 even after including X, we see evidence of conditional β-convergence. This is, with some variations in the exact specification, the methodology employed by most prior studies of convergence in consumer prices (see, for example, Honohan and Lane, 2003; Engel and Rogers, 2004) .
Due to the short period with the euro, employing (1') or (2) on the euro zone means having to work with small samples and being forced to use non-parametric regressions. An alternative is to use a panel-data approach, which combines cross-sectional and time-series data. This means that the measurement period T is shortened to allow multiple observations. This will add noise to the price processes. On the upside, the power of the testing will be increased through more observations. An advantage of using a panel is that we can allow for influences of non-convergence control factors in the form of unobservable individual country effects. This allows controlling for unspecified structural differences in price setting across the investigated countries.
A second weakness of β-convergence, and one that is shared by absolute and conditional convergence, is that all countries are assumed to converge at the same rate. This can be avoided by estimating (1') and (2) on time-series data individually for each country.
Individual estimation (which in effect would be a unit-root test) requires data at higher frequency (monthly or quarterly data), which introduces more noise into the modeling. Also, it does not exploit the cross-sectional dependence between individual countries' price series.
An alternative is to use seemingly unrelated regressions, which will explicitly take into consideration cross-sectional correlations among price series. Unfortunately, this will also greatly increase the number of parameters estimated, which will be detrimental to the power of the testing (Koedijk et al, 2004) .
A third commonly used convergence measure is σ-convergence. It measures, as was previously mentioned, the dispersion of price levels in a group of countries. Price levels are
where σ t is the time t standard deviation of log (p i,t ) across i. Countries will exhibit σconvergence if they also exhibit absolute β-convergence; the opposite causality does not hold, though. As pointed out previously, we find evidence of σ-convergence in the transition from the pre to post euro period.
IV. Absolute β-convergence -Empirical Results
To evaluate absolute β-convergence, we estimate (1') over the full period and the two subperiods. Results are reported in Table 3 . Since we are looking at cumulative price changes over the post euro period we are left with a small sample. To avoid bias from outliers, we make robust rank-based estimations as a complement to ordinary OLS. Columns (a) present estimates of (1') using OLS, while Columns (b) present estimates of (1') using OLS on ranked data.
Insert Table 3 about here
Irrespective of method used, manufacturing producer prices exhibit absolute βconvergence; all convergence parameters are significant both over the full period and in each sub-period. Using the OLS coefficient, the speed of convergence was about 3 percent per year over the full sample as well as in the pre euro period, and 6 percent per year in the post euro period. The difference in speed is not significant, however. Converting the βs into bs, we can calculate half-lives of shocks to prices. The implied half-life in the post euro period is 11.6 years, whereas it is 24.5 years in the pre euro period. Both half-lives imply very slow rates of mean reversion compared to studies on consumer prices, which typically tend to find halflives of 3-5 years (see Kenneth Rogoff, 1996, for a review of evidence on absolute and relative law of one price). The rank-based estimations imply much faster half-lives of 2.3 years (post euro period) and 1.9 years. These half-lives are somewhat longer than the ones found by Parsley and Wei (2001), who find about 1 year for tradable goods, and Goldberg and Verboven (2004), who find about 1.3 years for automobiles.
A. Robustness Checks
For robustness, we perform two alternative robust estimations of (1), (i) robust nonparametric rank-based regressions based on the Wilcoxon score function, with intercepts estimated by the median of the residuals and (ii) least-absolute-deviations regressions. The results of both approaches confirm the results in Table 3 , with all bs being significant. 12
To increase the power of the testing, we increase the number of observations by using panels of yearly observations (T = 1 year) across all ten countries. Results of the panel regressions are reported in Columns (c). Using a panel increases the number of observations for each country, but also introduces more noise. Given the small size of our cross-section and the general lack of power in robust estimation, the increase in number of observations dominates. The conclusions are the same as for the long-low-frequency estimates in Columns (a) and (b) with significant convergence in both the full period and the two sub-periods.
Speeds of convergence are similar to the ones found using rank-OLS estimations; implied half-lives are 3.3 years and 1.9 years in the post and pre euro periods. This difference is significant.
In the panel estimations we control for fixed country effects to account for any non-time country-specific price changes. In the full sample, this control does not add any explanatory value; the adjusted R 2 is even smaller after controlling for fixed country effects. In the two 20 sub-periods the effect is much more marked with substantial increases in adjusted R 2 s and larger coefficient estimates. The levels of significance of estimated coefficients are not influenced, however. Controlling for fixed time effects (that is, controlling for unspecified structural yearly differences) increases adjusted R 2 in all samples, but yields nearly identical coefficients and levels of significance.
V. Conditional β-convergence -Empirical Results
To allow for a more complete specification of price developments, we now turn to testing conditional β-convergence. Due to lack of data, we have to restrict our testing to 1994-2004.
We have argued for several factors that could be expected to cause a link between the introduction of the euro and producer prices beyond price convergence, namely economic convergence and the B-S hypothesis, exchange-rate fluctuations and the existence of price rigidities, and the composition of each member country's effective, trade-weighted exchange rate. To test these potential explanations, we add growth in labor productivity in the manufacturing sector (PROD) to test the economic convergence hypothesis and changes in the nominal trade-weighted exchange rate (NEER) and, in the pre euro period, in the DC/ECU rate (ECU) to test the importance of price rigidities. 13
A. Hypotheses
Our hypotheses about the impact of our added variables on producer-price inflation in the transition to a common currency are the following. We expect a positive coefficient on PROD, since according to the B-S hypothesis productivity increases would drive wages, which in turn would drive nontradables prices. If there were no price rigidities, foreign exporters would pass through exchange-rate changes. Then we would expect a negative coefficient on NEER in the post euro period (quoted indirectly as FC/DC, depreciations of the euro would be passed through to increasing sales prices). With price rigidities and full pricing-to-market, there would be no relationship between NEER and price changes. In the pre euro period, we include two exchange-rate variables (ECU and NEER). The marginal effect of NEER (after controlling for ECU) would range from -1 (no price rigidities) to 0 (full pricingto-market). The marginal effect of ECU would instead range from -1 (full pricing-to-market, since we express prices in ECUs) to 0 (full pass-through). To formally test conditional β-convergence, we estimate
B. Results
where ∆ t,t+T denotes cumulative change between t and t+T. Results for full-period changes are reported in Table 4 with OLS estimates in Columns (a) and rank OLS estimates in Columns
There is support for conditional β-convergence in the full sample and, in particular, in the pre euro period, but not conclusively in the post euro period; in the post euro period, only estimations using OLS yield a significant β. Estimated speeds of convergence, using the OLS estimates in Columns (a), are 3 percent per year in the two sub-periods. For robustness, we perform non-parametric rank-based (Wilcoxon) regressions and least-absolute-deviations regressions of (4). They yield qualitatively similar results; the coefficient on convergence is significantly negative for all periods except for the full sample period in the least-absolutedeviations estimation. 14 NEER is significant in both sub-periods, but not in the full sample. In line with Figure 3 , coefficients are positive in the pre euro period, but negative in the post euro period. The negative coefficients in the post euro period suggest (at least partial) pass-through of exchange-rate changes. PROD is only significant in the post euro period, but with negative sign. In the non-parametric and least-absolute-deviations regressions, both NEER and PROD are significant in the post euro period and near significant in the full sample.
C. Panel regressions
To increase power of the testing, we estimate panel regressions of (4) on yearly price changes, allowing for fixed country effects. Here, we include ECU in the pre euro period. In addition, we control for the following standard drivers of output prices. In a non-competitive market, increasing costs would be passed through to customers (cost-plus pricing). Labor is a major production factor in the manufacturing sector, motivating inclusion of labor costs as a control. We therefore include the growth in hourly compensation costs in the manufacturing sector (HCC). We also include the country's output gap as calculated by the OECD, (GAP), to control for the business cycle. Finally, we include beginning-of-period long-term (10-year government bond) interest rates (INT) to control for the impact of the cost capital due to the often heavy usage of fixed capital in the manufacturing sector. 15 We expect positive coefficients on HCC (increasing labor costs passed through to output prices) and GAP (increasing prices in times of expansion). Our expectations on INT is indeterminate (a negative coefficient could come from higher interest rates reduce investment activities and growth whereas a positive relationship could be caused by pass through of increasing interest costs).
Results are reported in Table 5 . Again, there is strong support for conditional βconvergence, with significantly negative coefficients in all periods and irrespective of model specification. Implied half-lives are similar to prior estimations: 2.4-3.1 years (1.7-2.7 years) in the post (pre) euro periods.
NEER and PROD both turn out significant in the post euro period and with the expected signs. In the full model, we cannot reject full pass-through (γ 1 = -1) of NEER. This suggests that both the B-S and the inflation-import effects were at work during the post euro period. This is contrary to the pre euro period; NEER is significant in one model in the pre euro period, but with a positive coefficient, whereas PROD is insignificant. Results for the remaining three control variables are mixed. HCC is significant and positive, as expected, in both periods, while GAP is significant only in the pre euro period. INT is significant in both periods, but with positive coefficients. This means that a high long-term interest rate at the beginning of the year leads to higher inflation during the year, which suggests that pass through of interest costs dominates the standard assumption of high interest rates being contractionary.
D. Robustness checks
To further check the robustness of the results, we test alternative specifications; results are presented in Table 6 for the full-period estimates. Ignazio Angeloni and Michael Ehrmann (2004) find a strong persistence in inflation developments. To test this, we add a one-year lag to inflation. The results in Column (a) show that this effect is not present in our data. As a second check, we lag all variables except the price level one year to allow for lags in price adjustments (Column (b) ). The main consequences are that the significance of INT increases, while HCC turns near significant. This suggests that there are lags in the responses to interest rates and changes in labor costs. This is perhaps not surprising, given multiplier effects of interest-rate changes and standard inflexibilities in wage negotiations. To test this further, we only lag HCC and INT one year (Column (c)). The only consequence is that the significance of HCC increases further. We also test this last model specification on the two sub-periods. In the post euro period, the primary effect is that the significance of INT disappears. In the pre euro period the significances of both HCC and INT disappears.
E. Decomposing the post euro period
If we turn back to Figure 1 and look more closely at producer-price developments in the post euro period, we see that prices increased during the first two years and then stabilized. An even closer look at individual countries would have made this even more apparent. Inflation 25 rates in the first two years for some countries reached levels not seen since the early 1980s.
Annual inflation rates during the rest of the post euro period have instead been historically low, being at levels comparable to those just prior to the introduction of the euro.
Considering these patterns, can we see two phases in the post euro period? To investigate this, we divide our annual data into two groups, 1999-2000 and 2001-2004. Results from panel OLS regressions are reported in Table 6 . For parsimony, we exclude GAP.
Beginning with the first two years, the initial price level and PROD are significant. As for all other periods investigated, price convergence seems to be important, together with the B-S effect. Both these effects remain unchanged in the latter part of the post euro period, though with a slower speed of price convergence. In this part of the period, NEER also turns out significant and with an expected negative sign.
To summarize our findings as regards annual producer-price changes following the introduction of the euro, price convergence, productivity growth, and effective euro changes seem to drive producer prices in the euro zone. Exchange-rate effects were more important in the later years.
F. The influence of the euro on producer prices
Despite the short time period under investigation (six-seven years since the introduction of the euro) and thereby the fairly few data points available for the analysis we have -by using different techniques to mitigate that problem -found robust results as regards the relative inter-temporal influence from driving forces of producer-price developments. We find strong support for price convergence, both in an absolute and a conditional sense. We also find support for σ-convergence. We can safely say that producer prices are converging in the euro zone.
Did the euro lead to increased price convergence? Not directly, since significances of absolute and conditional β coefficients and speeds of convergence are similar before and after the introduction of the euro. The introduction as such does not seem to have influenced βconvergence. Prior studies of price developments in the euro zone have focused on dispersion in consumer prices. Among these, the three studies most resembling ours are Engel and Rogers (2004) , Honohan and Lane (2003), and Rogers (2004) . Honohan and Lane and Rogers find strong price-convergence effects in the post euro period, whereas Engel and Rogers do not. Honohan and Lane's and Rogers' results are as strong as ours.
Moving from testing absolute to conditional β-convergence does not influence estimated speeds of convergence, which must be interpreted as support for absolute β-convergence. In the extension this means that price levels are actually converging towards a common equilibrium. This is further strengthened by the fact that intercept terms (not reported) are constantly insignificant. The speed of convergence has been estimated to be around 3 percent, which suggests convergence over a 25-year period.
Productivity growth also has a significant impact on producer-price inflation. Looking at medium-term price changes (the cross-sectional estimations), productivity growth seems to influence prices negatively rather than positively as predicted by the B-S hypothesis. Rogers (2004) and Honohan and Lane (2003) find the same result for consumer prices after the euro introduction, but using yearly panel data. As they point out, several recent studies have found inverse relationships between productivity and prices. A negative coefficient suggests that countries that have seen the largest productivity increases have experienced the smallest price increases. Gianluca Benigno and Christoph Thoenissen (2003) suggest that firms that experience productivity increases can, under imperfect competition, reduce prices without affecting the profit margin, which would motivate a negative relationship. On the other hand, when testing on annual price changes, we find the expected positive relationship between 27 productivity growth and inflation. This suggests that the B-S effect is at work at a yearly level, but not when reducing the periodicity. This divergence in relationships in the short and medium term is intriguing.
We also find support for Honohan and Lane's (2003) finding that the composition of the euro is asymmetric from an individual country viewpoint; the euro member countries' producer prices follow movements in the country's trade-weighted effective exchange rate. In line with Honohan and Lane, we interpret this as the import of inflation varying across countries.
The effects of productivity growth and effective exchange-rate changes differ significantly between the pre and post euro periods. The differences are consistent with what we would expect from the introduction of the euro, which suggests that the euro has influenced the behavior of producer prices. This could explain the increased dispersion in producer-price inflation we observe in the post euro period.
Looking at the panel results, productivity growth did not influence producer prices significantly in the pre euro period, whereas there is a significant positive effect in the post euro period. This is consistent with the B-S effect and the euro acting as a catalyst for increased economic convergence. This suggests that the relationship between productivity growth and producer-price inflation is temporary during the economic convergence period.
There is a notable change in the impact of effective exchange-rate changes on producer prices, with a significant and negative relationship between euro depreciations and producerprice increases in the post euro period. This suggests that pass through has increased in the transition to a common currency, which is as would be expected from increased price transparency. A direct consequence of increased price transparency is that the asymmetric effect of changes in the value of the euro is strengthened. This effect can be expected to remain as long as trade baskets differ across euro countries.
Taking a closer look at the two most extreme countries in terms of price changes, Ireland and Portugal, is revealing. In January 1999, Ireland had the second highest producerprice level among the investigated countries, some 11 percent above the average. Our panel regressions suggest that this would have a dampening effect on Irish producer-price inflation. This is countered by the fact that Ireland experienced the highest productivity growth over the period, 8.3 percent per year, which is markedly above the sample average of 2.8 percent. The above-average growth in labor costs (highest in the euro zone) would also add to inflation, while the about average change in the effective exchange rate would not. Portugal, on the other hand, experienced an average of 4.7 percent inflation per year over the period. This is primarily explained by an initial low price level (third lowest in January 1999), since all other variables are close to the euro zone averages.
VI. Concluding remarks
Our results may have profound policy implications for the current EU countries as well as for new countries considering the alternative of adopting a common currency. In the best of worlds, price convergence causing large and divergent producer-price increases could lead to a restructuring of the manufacturing sector in the euro zone. This would force firms to rationalize to stay competitive. Such beneficial developments would increase the competitiveness of the EU vis-à-vis the US and facilitate the achievement of the Lisbon agenda. The problem is that this process could be slow and painful (few countries can match the Irish example of exceptional productivity growth over a long stretch of years). Portuguese companies, for instance, face the risk of pricing themselves out of the market. Sticky wages and low levels of labor mobility, which are well-known problems in the euro zone, would mean that restructuring causes unemployment, in particular in the most affected countries. In this situation there is a considerable risk that exposed countries like Portugal will ask for the 29 favor of being bailed out by the EU. An increased granting of structural support by the EU to the most affected countries or industries will hinder the restructuring. There is also a risk of increased competition among exposed member countries, like Portugal, for inward direct investments through social dumping and tax exemptions (Lars Oxelheim and Pervez Ghauri, 2004) . Both scenarios will erode the role of the euro in fostering competition and would probably have an adverse effect on the future economic growth of the EU. To avoid these adverse scenarios it is important for policy makers in countries in the phase of transition to a common currency to know the driving forces at work in order to handle them adequately from a policy point of view. In particular, the detrimental effect of large swings in the value of the common currency on price convergence is important to keep in mind.
The implication of our results to policy on the EMU level is that asymmetric impacts of driving forces of producer-price inflation should be at least supervised, and at best moderated at the central-bank level with better control over inflation as measured by a wider price index than the consumer-price index and by an enhanced understanding at the national policy level of the inter-temporal distribution of effects of the driving forces as found in this study.
A topic for future research is the assessment of the gravity of the developments we have discussed. How large price gaps are sustainable under a single currency? Comparisons with the US could provide an answer, but are made impossible by the inexistence of producer-price data for US states. If price gaps are larger among countries in the euro zone than among states in the US, the euro zone with its markedly lower cross-border labor mobility will face difficulties. 36 10 The euro did not exist before January 1999, which requires specifying a synthetic euro before that. We follow Eurostat in using the ECU as our synthetic euro, using data from Eurostat's NewCronos Database (table EURER_MO, series Euro/ECU exchange rates -monthly averages). 11 As further evidence of σ-convergence, the average monthly dispersion over the post euro period is significantly smaller than the average dispersion in the pre euro period. 12 Estimated bs using Wilcoxon-based estimation are -0.059 *** , -0.047 ** , and -0.082 *** in the full sample, pre, and post euro periods; estimated bs using least-absolute-deviations regression are -0.036 ** , -0.030 ** , and -0.051 * , in the same three periods. 13 PROD is (the log of) yearly labor productivity for the manufacturing sector from the European Commission AMECO Database (table Gross value Manufacturing, 32 Countries or Areas, 22 Manufacturing Industries, 1992 -2004 Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels; t-statistics in parenthesis.
Columns (a) contain nonlinear least squares estimates of (1'), Columns (b) robust rank-OLS estimates of (1'), and Columns (c) panel OLS estimates of (1') on yearly data allowing for fixed country effects. Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels; t-statistics in parenthesis.
Sources
Columns (a) contain nonlinear least squares estimates of (4'), and Columns (b) robust rank-OLS estimates of (4'). 
